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1. INTRODUCTION
Starting with papers by Saloner (1987), Hamilton and Slutsky (1990),
and Robson (1990), there has been a growing literature studying models
of endogenous timing in oligopoly. These papers analyze extended tim-
ing games which establish conditions under which ﬁrms are likely to play
either a simultaneous-move game or a sequential-move game. The order
of output or price decisions is not exogenously speciﬁed. Rather, it is
derived from ﬁrms’ decisions about timing. Results from this literature
may indicate whether models of simultaneous output or price decisions
(Cournot, Bertrand) or sequential decisions (Stackelberg, price leadership)
are preferable.
The games used to determine endogenous timing have, in principle,
a simple structure. In Hamilton and Slutsky’s (1990) (henceforth HS)
extended game with action commitment, two ﬁrms may choose their action
in one of two periods. A ﬁrm may move ﬁrst by committing to an action or
it may wait until the second period and observe the other ﬁrm’s ﬁrst period
action. This extended timing game allows, a priori, for simultaneous-move
outcomes as well as for sequential-move outcomes.
What are the equilibrium predictions of the extended game with action
commitment? HS showed that—if equilibria in weakly dominated strate-
gies are dismissed—only sequential-move structures emerge endogenously.
With price competition, this result is not surprising as the outcome of
the sequential-move price leader game Pareto dominates the outcome
of the simultaneous-move Bertrand game. However, the same result also
holds with quantity competition where the Stackelberg leader is better
off than a ﬁrm in Cournot equilibrium while the Stackelberg follower is
worse off compared to Cournot. There are two endogenous Stackelberg
equilibria with either ﬁrm as the Stackelberg leader.3 While there exists a
simultaneous-move Cournot equilibrium in pure strategies, this equilibrium
is in weakly dominated strategies.
In closely related timing games with Cournot competition, Ellingsen
(1995) (extending Saloner’s (1987) model) and Robson (1990) came to
the same conclusion in the sense that only Stackelberg equilibria emerge
endogenously.4 Ellingsen (1995, p. 87) argued that “only Stackelberg
3Matsumura (1999) showed that this general conclusion does not hold in Cournot
oligopolies with more than two ﬁrms and with more than two production periods. In an
n-ﬁrm oligopoly playing HS’s game with action commitment, at least n − 1 ﬁrms choose the
ﬁrst production period endogenously. The generalized Stackelberg equilibrium in which each
ﬁrm chooses a different production period never occurs except in duopoly.
4In Saloner’s model, ﬁrms may produce their quantities in both periods. Robson’s analysis
is restricted to linear demand and cost. Moreover, he has an interest rate on production in
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points survive.” Similarly, Robson (1990, p. 70) concluded that an “argu-
ment in favor of Stackelberg at the expense of Cournot can be made
forcefully.” While ﬁrms are symmetric in these models, Stackelberg equi-
libria also emerge endogenously when ﬁrms are asymmetrically informed:
again, only Stackelberg equilibria with either the informed or the unin-
formed ﬁrm moving ﬁrst emerge (see Mailath, 1993, and Normann, 1997).
Note that, in all the papers mentioned, the general theoretical sup-
port for Stackelberg equilibria crucially depends on equilibrium selection
arguments. Simultaneous-move Cournot equilibria in pure strategies typ-
ically exist5—however, they do not survive the application of equilibrium
reﬁnements.
In this paper, we report on an experiment designed to test the HS model
with action commitment. We analyze a market with two symmetric ﬁrms
and with quantity competition. In particular, we check whether there is
experimental evidence for endogenous Stackelberg equilibria—or whether
some other (if any) equilibrium is selected by subjects.
There are two reasons to assume that the general theoretical evidence
for Stackelberg equilibria is not likely to ﬁnd deﬁnite support in exper-
imental markets. First, most of the literature has ignored the coordina-
tion problem ﬁrms face in a duopoly with endogenous timing.6 There exist
two Stackelberg equilibria, and either ﬁrm may emerge as the Stackelberg
leader. A priori, there is no reason why one equilibrium is preferable to the
other. In an experimental market, severe coordination problems may arise.
The second reason makes the ﬁrst one more forceful. Since ﬁrms are
symmetric it is, from a behavioral perspective, difﬁcult to see how players
should always coordinate on an asymmetric equilibrium with large pay-
off differences. It is well known from the ultimatum bargaining literature
(G¨ uth et al., 1982) that many subjects exhibit an aversion to disadvan-
tageous inequality in experiments. On top of the coordination problem,
this inequality aversion might render the Stackelberg equilibria unappeal-
ing candidates for convergence in an experiment.
In a companion paper (Huck et al., 2001; henceforth HMN), we studied
Stackelberg duopoly with exogenous Stackelberg leader and follower roles.
We found that followers often punish Stackelberg leaders who try to exploit
their ﬁrst-mover advantage. Given the empirical response function of the
followers (which differs substantially from the prediction), Stackelberg
5A simultaneous move Cournot equilibrium also exists in Robson (1990) if the interest rate
on ﬁrst-period production is equal to zero.
6A notable exception is van Damme and Hurkens (1999), who analyzed the HS extended
game with action commitment in the presence of cost differences. Also their model has two
pure strategy Stackelberg equilibria. However, by applying the tracing procedure (Harsanyi
and Selten, 1988), a unique Stackelberg equilibrium with the efﬁcient ﬁrm as the Stackelberg
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leaders would be much better off producing less than prescribed by the
subgame-perfect equilibrium. The parameters of the model and the exper-
imental design underlying the experiment to be reported in this paper are
the same as in HMN. The experiments in HMN also include some sessions
with simultaneous-move Cournot duopolies. We shall therefore sometimes
compare the results of HMN with Stackelberg and Cournot competition to
the present study of endogenous timing.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses
the theoretical background and introduces the market used in the experi-
ment. Section 3 illustrates the experimental procedures. Sections 4 and 5
present the experimental results, and Section 6 concludes.
2. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
Let us repeat the setup of HS’s extended game with action commitment.
This game modiﬁes the standard duopoly model by allowing for two pro-
duction periods before the market clears. Firms can choose their quantities
in one of the two periods, t = 1 2. A ﬁrm can move in period 1 by commit-
ting itself to a quantity—without knowing what its competitor is doing. By
waiting until period 2, a ﬁrm can observe the other ﬁrm’s period-1 quantity
(or its decision to wait). It is assumed that the market for the homogeneous
good exists only at period 2 and that production costs do not depend on
the production period.
Concerning the basic market game, HS rely on a number of rather gen-
eral assumptions. They assume that there is, under both simultaneous and
sequential play, a unique equilibrium in pure strategies and that these two
equilibria differ from each other. Further, they assume that the strategy
sets are compact, convex intervals of +.
A strategy of ﬁrm i in the game can be described by the triple
 q1
i f i q1
j  q 2
i , where q1
i either speciﬁes an output for period 1 or
indicates that the ﬁrm waits, i.e., q1
i ∈ Q ∪  W   with Q being the set of
possible outputs and W indicating the decision to wait. The function f q1
j 
is a mapping Q → Q specifying the ﬁrm’s reaction in case it has decided
to wait while the other ﬁrm has chosen q1
j  = W . Finally, q2
i speciﬁes ﬁrm
i’s quantity decision for the case where both ﬁrms have decided to wait.
The analysis of the extended game focuses on subgame-perfect equilibria.
Subgame perfection requires that fi q1
j  is the standard best-reply function
of a ﬁrm i facing ﬁrm j’s quantity q1
j on the basic market. Furthermore,
subgame perfection requires that q2
i be the Cournot-equilibrium quantity
of the basic market game. In the following, we will often simplify notation
and we will characterize equilibria only by the actions taken.244 huck, m¨ uller, and normann
HS identify three (subgame-perfect) equilibria in pure strategies: the
two Stackelberg equilibria in which one ﬁrm commits in period 1 to its
Stackelberg leader quantity and the other ﬁrm waits and reacts with the
Stackelberg follower quantity. The third equilibrium has both ﬁrms pro-
ducing the simultaneous play Cournot equilibrium quantities in period 1.
In our experiment we used the linear inverse demand function
p q1 + q2 =max 30 −  q1 + q2  0   (1)
Linear costs of production in both periods were given by
Ci qi =6qi i = 1 2  (2)
For this speciﬁcation, the HS predictions are as follows. In the two
Stackelberg equilibria the Stackelberg leader chooses qL
i = 12 in period
1, whereas the Stackelberg follower chooses qF
j = 6 in period 2. This
implies payoffs of  L
i = 72 and  F
j = 36  i j = 1 2  i  = j  respectively.7
The simultaneous-move Cournot equilibrium actions are qi = 8 result-
ing in payoffs of  i = 64  i = 1 2 , whereas the symmetric joint proﬁt
maximizing outputs are qi = 6, implying payoffs of  i = 72  i = 1 2 .
In our experiment subjects had to choose their quantities from a trun-
cated and discretized strategy space, yielding a standard payoff bimatrix.
We had two versions—one with a large payoff matrix where subjects had to
choose integer quantities between 3 and 15 and one with a smaller strategy
space. In the second version subjects could only choose among the quanti-
ties 6 8, and 12. We refer to the ﬁrst version as the one with a “large payoff
matrix” and to the second as the one with a “small payoff matrix.” For the
rest of this section, we shall only discuss the large matrix. We will come
back to the theoretical predictions for the sessions with the small matrix in
Section 5.
The truncated and discretized strategy space is an important difference
compared to HS’s modelling assumptions. First, discretized Cournot matrix
games derived from linear demand and cost may exhibit multiple Nash equi-
libria (see Holt, 1985). To avoid such multiplicity of equilibria, the entries
in the payoff table differed slightly from those implied by Eqs. (1) and (2)
(see Appendix Table A.I).8 As a consequence, best replies are unique in the
basic game and there is one simultaneous-move Cournot equilibrium and
two sequential-move Stackelberg equilibria in the extended game, namely
the equilibria mentioned above.
7As pointed out by Bagwell (1995), the theoretical prediction of the Stackelberg outcome
crucially depends on the perfect observability of the Stackelberg leader’s action. For experi-
mental evidence on this point see Huck and M¨ uller (2000).
8We subtracted 1 proﬁt unit (Taler) in 14 of the 2 ×169 = 338 entries to ensure uniqueness
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TABLE I
Truncation of the Extended Game (Large Matrix)





































The discretized strategy space has a second consequence: there exists
a variety of mixed strategy equilibria for the setup we have chosen.9 As
HS require equilibria not to be in weakly dominated strategies, we focus
on mixed equilibria with this property. More speciﬁcally, we analyze the
truncation of the extended game, in which the function fi denotes standard
best-response functions and in which q2
i is the Cournot equilibrium quantity
8 (see above). In this truncated game (in which the strategy sets are simply
given by  3 4     14 15 W   the strategies 3, 4, 5, 13, 14, and 15 are
strictly dominated. Among the remaining strategies, the quantities 6, 7, 8,
and 9 are weakly dominated by the wait strategy W . This leaves us with
the set  10 11 12 W . Thus, we can focus on the 4 × 4 game depicted in
Table I. It is easy to verify that this 4 × 4 game has only one symmetric
mixed equilibrium in which both players choose to wait with probability 3/5
and produce quantity 10 with the complimentary probability 2/5. We refer
to this equilibrium as the mixed Stackelberg equilibrium.
Summarizing, there are three Stackelberg equilibria in undominated
strategies in our experiment: the two asymmetric Stackelberg equilibria in
pure strategies and the symmetric mixed equilibrium in which ﬁrms commit
themselves to q = 10 with probability p = 2/5 and wait with probability
1 − p = 3/5. Furthermore, there is one pure equilibrium in weakly dom-
inated strategies, namely the Cournot equilibrium in which both players
choose quantity 8 in period 1, and there is also a variety of mixed strategy
equilibria in weakly dominated strategies.
9With linear demand and cost, and with a continuous action space, no mixed equilibrium
exists in which ﬁrms mix over committing to exactly one quantity in t = 1 and waiting. See HS
and van Damme and Hurkens (1999).246 huck, m¨ uller, and normann
3. EXPERIMENTAL PROCEDURES
The computerized experiment10 was conducted at Humboldt University
in November 1998. Ten subjects participated in the three sessions with
the large matrix, each consisting of 30 rounds.11 Additionally, we ran four
10-round sessions using the small payoff matrix. In each of these sessions
there were also 10 participants. Thus, altogether 70 subjects participated
in the experiment. They were students from various ﬁelds, mainly from
economics, business administration, and law.12 The sessions with the large
matrix lasted about 90 minutes; the sessions with the small matrix lasted
about 50 minutes.
In the instructions (see the Appendix) subjects were told that they would
act as a ﬁrm which, together with another ﬁrm, serves one market, and
that in each round both were to choose when and how much to produce.
In all sessions subjects were informed that in each round pairs of partic-
ipants would be randomly matched.13 After having read the instructions
participants could privately ask the experimenters questions.
Subjects were informed that, at the end of the experiment, 3 of the 30
rounds (large matrix) would be randomly selected to determine the actual
monetary proﬁt in German marks. The numbers given in the payoff tables
were measured in a ﬁctitious currency unit called Taler. The monetary pay-
ment was computed by using an exchange rate of 10:1 and adding a ﬂat pay-
ment of DM 5.14 (In the sessions with the small payoff matrix (see below) 2
out of 10 rounds were randomly selected to determine real payment.) Sub-
jects’ average earnings were DM 20 60 ($11.44 at the time) in the 30-round
sessions and DM 17 22 ($9.57) in the 10-round sessions (including the ﬂat
payment).
In the sessions with the large payoff matrix, before the ﬁrst round was
started subjects were asked to answer two control questions (which were
10We are grateful to Urs Fischbacher for letting us use his software toolbox “z-Tree”
(Fischbacher, 1999).
11In one of these sessions, only the results up to round 29 were saved. After the play of
round 30 of this session the network broke down so that the results of the last round were not
saved.
12Subjects were either randomly recruited from a pool of potential participants or invited
by leaﬂets distributed around the university campus.
13We think that randomly matched duopoly pairs, rather than ﬁxed pairs, are appropriate
when testing the predictions of the HS model. In HMN (with exogenous timing), the sessions
with ﬁxed duopoly pairs were considerably collusive, particularly in the simultaneous-move
treatment. Even when ﬁrms moved sequentially ` a la Stackelberg there was some collusion.
It is doubtful whether, with ﬁxed pairs and with endogenous timing, less collusion would be
observed.
14This payment was made since subjects could have made losses in the game.endogenous timing in experimental markets 247
checked) to make sure that everybody had full understanding of the pay-
off table. After each round (with both small and large matrix) subjects got
individual feedback about what happened in their market, i.e., the com-
puter screen showed the production period, the quantity, and the proﬁt of
both duopolists.
4. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS (LARGE MATRIX)
The results of sessions with the large matrix are reported in three sub-
sections. Section 4.1 presents aggregate results. Group effects are examined
in Section 4.2 and individual behavior is explored in Section 4.3. We will
concentrate on preemptive commitments in the ﬁrst period of a round,
on the reaction of endogenous Stackelberg followers, on the behavior of
two waiting ﬁrms deciding simultaneously in the second period, and on
overall market outcomes. As mentioned in the introduction, in HMN we
investigated Stackelberg and Cournot duopoly markets in which roles were
exogenously ﬁxed. In these experiments, 10 successive rounds were played
using the same payoff matrix and the same experimental design—except
that these experiments were run with pen and paper. Whenever useful we
will compare the results of the current experiment with the results of HMN.
4.1. Aggregate Data
Table II presents a summary of experimental results on an aggregate
level. Table II also shows the results of the Stackelberg and Cournot mar-
kets with random matching as observed in HMN. Inspection of Table II




In period 1 followers in period 2 Total
Average quantity 9.15 8.39 8.40 17.70
Standard deviation 1.91 1.75 1.67 1.93
Number of observations 543 207 140 890
HMN average quantity 10.19a 8.32a 8.07b 18 51a/16 14b
Standard deviation 2.45 2.07 1.61 2.86/3.21
Number of observations 220 220 240 220/240
aStackelberg market.
bCournot market.248 huck, m¨ uller, and normann
subjects committed themselves in period 1. In the remaining cases, subjects
decided to wait.
When committing themselves in t = 1, subjects chose on average about
one unit less than in the Stackelberg experiment with exogenous timing.
Since subjects who endogenously got into the position of a Stackelberg
follower chose about the same quantity as exogenous Stackelberg follow-
ers, the differences between total quantities in the two versions (17.70 vs.
18.51) seem to be entirely due to the fact that exogenous Stackelberg lead-
ers committed to higher quantities. Note, furthermore, that the average
quantity chosen in markets in which decisions were made simultaneously
in the second period are slightly higher than in the Cournot duopolies in
HMN (8.40 vs. 8.07).
Behavior in the First Period. To illustrate ﬁrst-period behavior, Fig. 1
shows absolute frequencies (across all sessions) of quantities chosen in the
ﬁrst period of a round. In the left panel of Fig. 1 these frequencies are
shown separately for the ﬁrst (rounds 1–15) and the second half (rounds
16–30) of the experiment. The right panel of Fig. 1 shows absolute fre-
quencies for all rounds of the experiment. First of all, recall that choosing
quantities of 3, 4, 5, 13, 14, and 15 is a strictly dominated action in the
two-stage quantity commitment game. According to Fig. 1, these quanti-
ties are rarely chosen in the ﬁrst period. Altogether, choices in the ﬁrst
period are quite dispersed over the range of quantities from 6 to 12. The
Stackelberg leader action, 12, was chosen in only 53 out of 543 cases
(9.8%). Instead, we observe that the quantities 8 and 10 were chosen most
often. This is true with respect to both the ﬁrst and the second half of the
experiment  #8 = 142  26 2%  #10 = 139  25 6%  . Moreover, whereas
the absolute frequencies with which quantities 8, 10, and 12 were chosen
remain rather constant over the two halves, this is not true for quantities 6,
7, 9, and 11. Here we observe that quantities of 9 and 11 were chosen less
often in the second half, whereas quantities of 6 and 7 were chosen more
often in the second half of the experiment. In fact, the frequency of choos-
ing quantities 6 and 7 increases from 9.9% in the ﬁrst half to 24.4% in the
second. Thus behavior becomes more cooperative over time. Regarding
the high frequency of q = 10, recall that playing this quantity in the ﬁrst
period is part of the symmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium in undominated
strategies.
Behavior of Endogenous Stackelberg Followers. Figure 2 shows best res-
ponses as well as average observed responses of endogenous Stackelberg
followers. Additionally, it shows average responses of exogenous Stackelberg
followers as observed in HMN. The empirical response function of exoge-
nous Stackelberg followers virtually coincides with the theoretical best-
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FIG. 2. Best- and observed response functions of Stackelberg followers.
than or equal to 7. However, exogenous Stackelberg followers as reported
in HMN produce on average more than 1 unit more than prescribed by the
best-response function if Stackelberg leaders produce more than 7 units.
The endogenous Stackelberg followers in this experiment behaved accord-
ing to the following empirical response function. We ﬁrst observe that, for
qL < 7  the average responses are below the observed responses of exoge-
nous followers. For 7 ≤ qL ≤ 9  the behavior of exogenous and endogenous
Stackelberg followers almost coincides. Finally, for qL > 9  endogenous
Stackelberg followers produce actually more. Thus one clearly sees that (i)
endogenous Stackelberg followers reward cooperation more often and (ii)
endogenous Stackelberg followers punish harder than exogenous followers
if Stackelberg leaders commit to high outputs.
The best-reply function is given by qF = 12 − 0 5qL (for continuous
actions).15 Estimating the followers’ actual response function by a sim-
ple linear regression model for the endogenous timing experiment, we get
qF = 6 98 + 0 154qL (for a more complex regression, see the next subsec-
tion). Surprisingly, the response function is upward sloping. It is even more
interesting to look at the response function for the ﬁrst half of the exper-
iment and the second half of the experiment separately. For the ﬁrst half
15A linear regression estimation of the best-reply function for the discretized game yields
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(rounds 1–15) we get qF = 9 596 − 0 149qL  whereas for the second half
(rounds 16–30) of the experiment we get qF = 4 59 + 0 442qL  The strik-
ing result is that, over time, the empirical response function clearly moves
away from the best-response function. In the second half, the reward-for-
cooperation-and-punishment-for-exploitation scheme that second movers
apply becomes more pronounced, which probably explains the higher fre-
quency of collusive choices taken in the ﬁrst period (see above).
Behavior in Case of Simultaneous Decisions in the Second Period. When
deciding simultaneously in the second period, subjects play a standard
Cournot game. The average quantity chosen is 8.40 with a standard devi-
ation of 1 67. This does not vary signiﬁcantly across the ﬁrst and second
halves (8.30 (1.88) and 8.55 (1.91)). The average quantity is slightly larger
than the observed average in the simultaneous-move Cournot duopolies of
HMN.
Market Outcomes. We shall distinguish between rational outcomes and
boundedly rational outcomes. Table III shows absolute and relative frequen-
cies of outcomes classiﬁed along these lines. We deﬁne rational outcomes
as outcomes which stem from strategies which are either part of one of the
pure equilibria or part of the mixed equilibrium in undominated strategies
(these are the quantities 8, 10, or 12 in t = 1 or opt to wait, and in which
they play best replies in t = 2.) Playing rational strategies might lead to an
equilibrium, but coordination failures can also occur, e.g., both ﬁrms could
play Stackelberg leader (that is, engage in Stackelberg warfare) or one ﬁrm
could play Cournot in t = 1 while the other plays Stackelberg leader. We
refer to collusive strategies (i.e., to produce 6 or 7 in either period) and
to punishment strategies of followers (i.e., to produce strictly more than
TABLE III
Number of Outcomes (Large Matrix)
Number Number of cases incl.
Market outcome Type of cases quant. 9 and 11
Cournot Equilibrium 64(14.4%) 93 (20.9%)
Stackelberg Equilibrium 24(5.4%) 33 (7.4%)
Stackelberg/Cournot Coord. failure 27(6.1%) 41 (9.2%)
Stackelberg warfare Coord. failure 21(4.7%) 30 (6.7%)
Stackelberg punished Rational/bound. 43(9.7%) 55 (12.4%)
Collusion (successful) Boundedly rational 25(5.6%) 25 (5.6%)
Collusion (exploited) Bound./rational 19(4.3%) 19 (4.3%)
Collusion (failed) Bound./rational 34(7.6%) 41 (9.2%)
Others 188(42.2%) 108 (24.3%)
Sum 445(100%) 445 (100%)252 huck, m¨ uller, and normann
TABLE IV
Average Earnings of Actions in Period t = 1 (Large Matrix)
6 7 8 9 10 11 12 W
54.97 58.49 59.42 56.63 52.24 44.00 32.53 53.54
the best reply in t = 2  as boundedly rational strategies. Collusion may be
successful, it may be exploited in t = 2  or it may fail when one ﬁrm plays
6o r7i nt = 1 while the second ﬁrm plays Cournot or Stackelberg leader
in t = 1. Among the remaining strategies (3, 4, 5, 9, 11, 13, 14, and 15),
only 9 and 11 are chosen frequently. It is not very surprising that subjects
choose 9 and 11 more often than, say, 3 or 14 since it seems reasonable
to assume that subjects are more likely to choose nonequilibrium actions
that are close to equilibrium actions (Simon and Stinchcombe, 1995). For
this reason, we also report the results (in parentheses) when 9 and 11 are
viewed as quasiequilibrium strategies. Somewhat arbitrarily, we count 9 as
a Cournot action and 11 as a Stackelberg leader action.
Out of 445 outcomes, 257 (337) can be classiﬁed in our scheme. The
remaining 188 (108) outcomes involve the choice of a dominated strat-
egy or a nonbest reply in t = 2 not punishing the Stackelberg leader.
The most striking fact is that Stackelberg equilibria occur only rarely
(24 (33) outcomes or 5.4% (7.4%)). A subject who commits itself in
t = 1 faces the risk of a coordination failure (48 (71) cases) or of being
punished (43 (55) cases). Even successful collusion occurs more often than
a Stackelberg equilibrium. However, the collusive strategies are likely to
be exploited or to fail coordination.
The Cournot equilibrium is the most frequent outcome (64 (93) cases).
Playing Cournot is also (ex post) the most successful strategy across all
sessions; in contrast to playing Stackelberg leader, it is not punished by
followers in t = 2 and, when it clashes with a collusive ﬁrm in t = 1  it
yields a proﬁt at least as high as the (equilibrium) payoff of a Stackelberg
leader. Table IV contains the average earnings certain actions chosen in the
ﬁrst period yield. Playing a Stackelberg leader action (10, (11), 12) yields
a proﬁt strictly worse than the collusive strategies. The fact that the wait
strategy does worse than any quantity in t = 1 smaller than 10 is explained
by the high costs Stackelberg followers inﬂicted on themselves by punishing
Stackelberg leaders committed to high outputs.
4.2. Group effects
In this subsection we will brieﬂy examine group effects by looking at
the results for each of the sessions separately. Figure 3 shows absolute
frequencies of quantities chosen in earlier and later rounds of each session.
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TABLE V
Regression Results (Estimating Equation: qF = β0 + β1qL +
β2Half + β3Half ∗ qL +  )
β0 β1 β2 β3
8 46∗∗ −0 05 −5 52∗∗ 0 70∗∗
Session 1
(6.89)  −0 43   − 3 31  (3.93)
8 41∗∗ 0 00 −5 57∗ 0 70∗∗
Session 2
(4.11)  −0 01   − 2 21  (2.62)
11 73∗∗ −0 38∗∗ −3 38∗ 0 36∗
Session 3
(10.27)  −3 06   − 2 04  (2.00)
9 60∗∗ −0 15 −5 01∗∗ 0 59∗∗
Pooled data
(11.63)  1 72   4 48  (4.95)
Note: ∗∗ and ∗ denote signiﬁcant at the 1% and 5% levels
respectively. Absolute value of asymptotic t-statistics are given
in parentheses.
the simple regression model given in Table V. The dependent variable in the
equation given in Table V is the observed quantity, qF  of followers. The
two explanatory variables included are the quantity of Stackelberg leaders,
qL  and a dummy, Half, representing the ﬁrst (respectively, second) half of
the session. The dummy was introduced to control for experience effects.
It turns out that behavior is quite different across sessions.
In session 1, the quantities 7 and 10 were chosen most often, whereas
the Cournot quantity of 8 was rarely chosen. Comparing behavior in the
two halves of this session, the most striking result is that quantity 7 was
chosen more than twice as often in the second half than in the ﬁrst half.
Thus there is a clear shift toward more cooperative behavior. Inspecting
Table V, we ﬁnd that followers chose a rather ﬂat response function in
the ﬁrst half. They played more or less the Cournot quantity regardless of
what Stackelberg leaders did. So, it seems that followers tried to induce
Stackelberg leaders to play Cournot. (After all, the best reply to such a
response strategy is playing Cournot!) In the second half, the response
function is upward sloping and has a smaller intercept. As we have seen on
the aggregate level, endogenous followers learn to behave in a reciprocal
fashion. In turn, this is learned by endogenous Stackelberg leaders who
choose more collusive actions in the second half.
Next, consider session 2. In contrast to session 1, we observe that the
quantity 7 was chosen only twice whereas the Cournot quantity 8 is the
one that was chosen most often. We also observe that the frequency with
which quantity 6 was chosen clearly increases from the ﬁrst to the second
half. Note, furthermore, that quantities smaller than 6 or larger than 12endogenous timing in experimental markets 255
were virtually never chosen during the course of this session. Regarding
followers’ behavior, session 2 is virtually identical to session 1. As in session
1, followers start by playing Cournot (regardless of the Stackelberg leader’s
choice) and then shift to an upward sloping response function.
Finally, consider session 3. Whereas the collusive quantity 6 was chosen
only once, we observe that quantities 8 and 10 were chosen most often.
Interestingly, the number of choices of quantity 8 decreases whereas the
number of choices of quantity 10 increases from the ﬁrst to the second half
of the experiment. With respect to followers, we ﬁnd that they start with a
response function very “close” to the rational one. However, they change
their behavior in the second half where their response function is similar to
those of followers in the ﬁrst halves of sessions 1 and 2: it is more or less
ﬂat and prescribes the Cournot quantity. It would have been interesting
to see whether this process would have continued if there had been more
rounds of play. In any case, the more aggressive behavior of Stackelberg
leaders in session 3 can be explained by the more rational response function
of followers in the ﬁrst half and the less reciprocal one in the second.
4.3. Individual Behavior
An interesting question is whether behavior converged on the individual
level. Do some subjects always commit themselves? If so, which quantity
do they play? Are there pure followers, possibly playing best reply? More
speciﬁcally, we searched for subjects who had chosen the same production
period in at least 25 of the 30 periods. There were not too many: Five
subjects almost always committed themselves and three subjects almost
always waited until t = 2. The behavior of these subjects is quite telling.
The ﬁve subjects almost always committing cannot generally be classiﬁed
as pure Stackelberg leaders. One subject produced a quantity of 6 in 28 out
of 30 rounds. This subject is thus a pure collusive player. A second subject
produced a quantity of 8 in 22 out of 28 rounds in which he or she com-
mitted in t = 1 (average quantity produced in t = 1 was 8 23)—a Cournot
player. A third subject must also be classiﬁed as a Cournot player (aver-
age quantity 8 38), though this person also experimented with the quanti-
ties 7 and 10. Another subject chose 12 in 15 out of 30 rounds and 8 in
the remaining rounds. In accordance with our aggregate and group data,
this person played 12 in the beginning and, apparently being discouraged,
played exclusively 8 over the last 10 rounds. Only one subject may be classi-
ﬁed as a Stackelberg leader (average quantity: 10 00), but even this subject
occasionally produced 8 in t = 1. He or she started with producing 12, but
then reduced the output to 10 or 8 over the last third of the experiment.
The behavior of the subjects who almost always waited is strikingly
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Stackelberg followers, they played tit-for-tat to a very large extent.
One subject strictly played tit-for-tat. That is, this person produced exactly
the same quantity as the Stackelberg leader in every period except one. A
second subject very often did so, though occasionally punishing Stackelberg
leaders even more severely than plain tit-for-tat would have prescribed.
The third subject played tit-for-tat in each of the last 14 rounds of the
experiment (and occasionally earlier on).
4.4. Discussion
In this subsection we summarize the main results of the experiments with
the large payoff matrix and discuss their implications. In view of the theory
we embarked on testing, the most important result is the following:
Result 1. HS’s prediction fails. Endogenous Stackelberg equilibria are
extremely rare and their frequency does not increase with experience.
The next two results implicitly offer explanations for this.
Result 2. Subjects have problems in coordinating their actions. In
roughly 25% of all cases, we ﬁnd evidence of coordination failures.
Result 3. Endogenous Stackelberg followers exhibit an aversion to dis-
advantageous inequality. Over time they learn to employ reciprocal (upward
sloping) response functions, rewarding cooperation and punishing exploita-
tion.
As a consequence of this we ﬁnd:
Result 4. The frequency of collusive outputs is increasing over time.
Finally, we note:
Result 5. Cournot equilibria are the most frequent outcomes.
In spite of these ﬁve results, it is difﬁcult to offer a complete descrip-
tion of behavior. Although we can indicate some trends, we do not ﬁnd
convergence. Rather, behavior is quite dispersed, even when subjects have
gained experience. Furthermore, it is not perfectly clear how to interpret
some of the frequently chosen actions. For example, the choice of q1
i = 10
might be interpreted as a compromise between full exploitation of the the-
oretical ﬁrst-mover advantage but it can also be seen as the outcome of
mixed-equilibrium play. With strategies not in support of the equilibria we
focused on, it is even harder to assess their precise meaning. As a conse-
quence of this, we conducted four additional sessions with a smaller payoff
matrix which are discussed in the following section.endogenous timing in experimental markets 257
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5. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS (SMALL MATRIX)
In the sessions with the small payoff matrix, subjects had to choose their
quantities from the set  6  8  12   The reduced matrix in Table VI was the
basis for these sessions.16 The time horizon was reduced to 10 periods of
which 2 periods were randomly selected to determine real payment. Every-
thing else in the design remained unchanged. Concerning pure strategy
equilibria, the equilibrium predictions with the small matrix are similar to
those of the large matrix. However, there now exists a symmetric mixed
equilibrium in which ﬁrms randomize over committing to 12 and waiting.17
The equilibrium probability for a commitment is p = 2/11  As with the
large matrix, the Cournot-like equilibria are in weakly dominated strate-
gies.
Table VII presents a summary of experimental results at the aggregate
level. We observe that, in 136 out of 400 cases (34%), subjects commit-
ted themselves in period 1. The proportion of committing ﬁrms is much
smaller than that observed with the large matrix. Average outputs are
slightly smaller compared to those observed with the large matrix.
Quantity choices are summarized in Table VIII, where behavior of the
ﬁrst 5 rounds is shown in the top row, rounds 6–10 are shown in the mid-
dle row, and all 10 rounds are at the bottom of the table. The table consists
16In the instructions, we actually labelled the strategies 6, 8, and 12 by 1, 2, and 3. The
labels 6, 8, and 12 are meaningless for the subjects (recall that they did not know the demand
and cost parameters of the model). Moreover, the difference between 8 and 12 is larger than
the difference between 6 and 8. So the action 12 might appear to be a rather extreme choice
to subjects and, hence, they might be biased against this action. To avoid confusion, here in
the paper, we refer to quantities 6, 8, and 12.
17There exists also a continuum of mixed equilibria (in weakly dominated strategies) in




In period 1 followers in period 2 Total
Average quantity 8.65 7.89 7.60 16.05
Standard deviation 2.24 1.22 1.21 1.64
Number of observations 136 94 170 200
of several 3 × 3 matrices. The left matrix shows quantity decisions for the
case where both ﬁrms produce in period 1, the middle matrix shows out-
put decisions in the case of endogenous Stackelberg leaders and followers,
and the right matrix shows output combinations for the case where both
TABLE VIII
Summary of Experimental Results (Small Matrix)
First half (rounds 1–5)
t = 1
68 1 2
6 1 1 2
t = 18 — 2 4
12 — — 0
t = 2
68 1 2
6 1 11 1
t = 18 1 17 0
12 6 6 0
t = 2
68 1 2
6 6 20 0
t = 28 — 18 3
12 — — 0
Second half (rounds 6–10)
t = 1
68 1 2
6 0 5 0
t = 18 — 1 5
12 — — 0
t = 2
68 1 2
6 1 8 0
t = 182 24 1
12 4 8 3
t = 2
68 1 2
6 1 8 0
t = 28 — 28 1




6 1 6 2
t = 18 — 3 9
12 — — 0
t = 2
68 1 2
6 2 19 1
t = 18 3 41 1
12 10 14 3
t = 2
68 1 2
6 7 28 0
t = 28 — 46 4
12 — — 0
Numbers of outcomes in the case of simultaneous decisions in period 1 (left), in the case
of sequential decisions (middle), and in the case of simultaneous decision in period 2 (right).endogenous timing in experimental markets 259
TABLE IX
Number of Outcomes (Small Matrix)
Market outcome Type Frequency
Cournot Equilibrium 90(45%)
Stackelberg Equilibrium 10(5%)
Stackelberg/Cournot Coord. failure 9(4.5%)
Stackelberg warfare Coord. failure 0(0%)
Stackelberg Punished Rational/bound. 17(8.5%)
Collusion (succesful) Boundedly rational 10(5%)
Collusion (exploited) Bound./rational 19(9.5%)
Collusion (failed) Bound./rational 36(18%)
Others 9(4.5%)
Sum 200(100%)
ﬁrms produce in the second period. We ﬁnd that endogenous Stackelberg
followers punish harder in the second half of the experiment than in the
ﬁrst. However, in contrast to the results with the large matrix, positive reci-
procity does not increase, i.e., followers almost always play best replies as
long as endogenous Stackelberg leaders commit to quantities of 6 or 8. The
best reply to both actions is to choose a quantity of 8. Average responses
are fairly homogeneous across the two halves.
Table IX classiﬁes the market outcomes according to the scheme we
developed above. Note that, with the small payoff matrix, the classiﬁcation
of market outcomes is unique, since there are no actions which are close to
the collusive, Cournot, or Stackelberg leader actions. With respect to our
main question, the result is clear-cut. Endogenous Stackelberg equilibria
occur even less frequently (5%) than with the large matrix. When players
commit themselves in the ﬁrst period, they choose the Cournot or the collu-
sive action rather than the Stackelberg leader action. Thus, HS’s prediction
fails again, although the game is considerably less complex than before. The
increased simplicity of the game has further effects: unclassiﬁable (not even
boundedly rational) outcomes virtually disappear and coordination failure
becomes less of an issue (4.5% vs. 15.8%). At the same time, Cournot out-
comes become much more frequent (45% vs. 20.9%). The frequencies of
successful and unsuccessful collusion are roughly similar to those in the
large-matrix version.
We conclude the discussion of aggregate results with a look at ex post
realized payoffs. The best ﬁrst-period choice was to wait with an average
ex post payoff of 62 62. The other actions 6, 8, and 12 yielded average pay-
offs of 59 25  61 33, and 51 79, respectively. This explains why commitment
in the ﬁrst period is much rarer in the sessions with the small matrix than
in the sessions discussed above (34.5% vs. 61%) where commitment paid
more than waiting.260 huck, m¨ uller, and normann
Behavior across the four sessions was quite homogenous in the treat-
ment with the small matrix as there were only few signiﬁcant group effects.
Regarding choices made in the ﬁrst period, average quantities chosen rise
from the ﬁrst to the second half in three of the four sessions (from 7.5 to
8.1 in session 1, from 8.0 to 8.9 in session 2, and from 8.9 to 9.1 in session
4)—although the groups started from different levels. Only in session 3, in
which subjects commit to high quantities in the ﬁrst half, does the average
quantity decrease in the course of the experiment (from 10.1 to 9.2). Fol-
lower behavior is also quite homogenous. Average responses to quantities
of 6 or 8 in each half of the four sessions deviate from 8, if at all, by at
most 0.5 units. The only differences worth mentioning are due to reactions
to the Stackelberg leader quantity of 12, to which the best response is to
choose an output of 6. In sessions 1 and 2 endogenous Stackelberg leaders
committing to quantity 12 in the ﬁrst period are punished in both halves of
these sessions (average response is 8.0). However, endogenous Stackelberg
followers in sessions 3 and 4 react rather gently in the ﬁrst half (6.7 vs. 7.0)
whereas they punish much harder in the second half of the experiment (8.5
vs. 8.7).
We ﬁnally take a look at individual behavior. We selected subjects who
either committed or waited in at least 9 of the 10 rounds. As the total
number of commitments in t = 1 is smaller than with the large matrix, it
is not surprising that we found fewer subjects almost always committing (3
out of 40) and more subjects almost always waiting (9). As with the large
matrix, the subjects who committed themselves in t = 1 are by no means
Stackelberg leaders. Instead, they have to be classiﬁed as Cournot players.
One subject chose the Cournot quantity in t = 1 in 10 out of 10 rounds.
A second subject chose a quantity of 8 in 8 of 10 rounds while attempt-
ing to collude in 2 rounds. The third subject produced the Stackelberg
leader quantity in t = 1 twice, but, in 6 out of 9 commitments, he or she
played Cournot, particularly over the second half of the experiment (aver-
age quantity 8 60). The behavior of the subjects who waited does not yield
much insight because of the large proportion of Cournot outcomes at the
aggregated level (45%). Occasionally, a Stackelberg leader was punished
or an attempt to collude was exploited by these subjects. But most of the
time, Cournot was answered by Cournot.
What can we conclude from these results? In our view, the most impor-
tant aspect of the small-matrix data is that the failure of HS’s theoretical
predictions which we observed in the large game is not due to its complex-
ity. Given the small amount of unclassiﬁable outcomes in the small-matrix
game we can be sure that subjects understood the game well. Nevertheless,
they did not play Stackelberg games. Furthermore, the failure of the the-
ory cannot be exclusively attributed to the coordination problem. With theendogenous timing in experimental markets 261
small matrix coordination failures are rare. Rather, it seems that subjects
prefer symmetric Cournot outcomes to asymmetric outcomes.
6. CONCLUSION
Recent theoretical contributions have made forceful arguments support-
ing endogenous Stackelberg equilibria. The data of our experimental test
show, however, that endogenous Stackelberg leadership does not occur to
the degree theory predicts. The theoretical criterion to prefer pure-strategy
equilibria in undominated strategies over other equilibria turns out to be
of little behavioral importance. Rather, we see the emergence of Cournot
outcomes and, sometimes, collusive outcomes.
An important driving force for this result is the behavior of endogenous
Stackelberg followers who learn to behave in a reciprocal fashion over time.
In games with an exogenous ﬁrst-mover advantage, it is sometimes claimed
that nonrational response functions of second movers are likely to disappear
(or, at least, to become “more rational” when subjects have the opportunity
to learn). Our data show that, when timing decisions are endogenous, the
opposite may happen. To this extent the framework we studied here offers
some hints about why the behavioral rule of reciprocity may have evolved.
In our case, it helps subjects to resurrect initial symmetry.
Although our data refute HS’s predictions, this does not imply that
endogenous Stackelberg leadership is generally unlikely to arise. In all our
sessions we focused on symmetric ﬁrms and introducing cost asymmetries
(van Damme and Hurkens, 1999) could change the picture. However, an
examination of this hypothesis requires a full-ﬂedged study of its own.
There are more options for future research. For example, we pointed
out in the Introduction that endogenous price leadership might be more
likely to be observed in a laboratory than endogenous Stackelberg leader-
ship, as sequential decisions may increase the payoffs of both ﬁrms when




Welcome to our experiment! Please read these instructions carefully! Do not talk to your
neighbors and keep quiet during the entire experiment. If you have any questions, give notice.
We will answer them privately.
18For experimental evidence on sequential price competition in duopoly markets (with
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In our experiment you can earn different amounts of money, depending on your behavior
and that of other participants matched with you. All participants read identical instructions.
You have the role of a ﬁrm which produces the same product as a second ﬁrm in the market.
First you have to decide, at which time you want to produce. There are two possibilities: the
ﬁrst and the second production periods. Afterward, you decide on the quantity you want to
produce.
If you choose the ﬁrst production period, you decide about your production quantity imme-
diately afterward. At this point in time you will not know how the other ﬁrm has decided about
its production period. If the other ﬁrm has chosen the second production period, it will be
informed about the amount you have chosen before it decides about its own quantity.
If you choose the second production period, you get the following information before you
decide on your quantity: If the other ﬁrm has made a decision about its quantity on the ﬁrst
period of production, you will be informed about this quantity. If the other ﬁrm has also
chosen the second production period, you will be informed about this.
Note that the proﬁt in each round depends only on the chosen quantities, not on the choice
of production periods.
In the accompanying payoff table (Table A.I), you can see the resulting proﬁts of both ﬁrms
for all possible choices of quantity.
The table is read as follows: At the head of a row the quantity of your ﬁrm is indicated and
at the head of a column the quantity of the other ﬁrm is stated. In the cell at which row and
column intersect, your proﬁt is noted in the upper left and the other ﬁrm’s proﬁt is stated in
the lower right. All proﬁts are expressed in a ﬁctional currency, which we call Taler.
The experiment consists of 30 rounds. After each round, you will be informed about the
period of production, the quantity, and the proﬁt of the other ﬁrm. You do not know with
which participant you serve the same market. You will be randomly matched with a participant
each round. The decisions are made at the computer.
Anonymity is kept among participants and instructors, as your decisions will only be iden-
tiﬁed with your code number. You will discreetly receive your payment by showing your code
number at the end of the experiment.
Concerning the payment note the following: At the end of the experiment 3 out of the 30
rounds will be randomly drawn to determine your payment. The sum of your proﬁts in “Taler”
of (exclusively) these 3 rounds determines your payment in deutsche marks. For 10 “Taler”
you will receive DM 1. In addition to this money, you will receive DM 5 independently of
your proﬁt during the 30 rounds.
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